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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
MICHAEL LYNN RAY,
Defendant-Appellant.
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NO. 45604
Twin Falls County Case No.
CR42-17-6722

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF

Issue
Has Ray failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion by imposing a
seven-year fixed sentence upon his guilty plea to possession of methamphetamine?

Ray Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion
Ray was on parole for aggravated battery on a law enforcement officer and felony
possession of a controlled substance, and had absconded supervision, when he used
methamphetamine, entered the yard of a private residence, “got a drink out of their hose,” and
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began “screaming and talking to himself.” (PSI, pp.4-5, 13-14, 17; 1 R., pp.8-9; 11/6/17 Tr.,
p.10, Ls.16-18; p.12, Ls.21-22.) The homeowners contacted the police and, when officers
responded, Ray admitted that he “had two knives on him.” (R., p.8.) Upon checking Ray’s
pockets for the weapons, officers found the knives and a glass pipe containing methamphetamine
residue. (R., p.8.)
The state charged Ray with possession of drug paraphernalia and possession of
methamphetamine, with a persistent violator enhancement. (R., pp.47-52.) Pursuant to a plea
agreement, Ray pled guilty to possession of methamphetamine and the state dismissed the
remaining charge and the enhancement. (R., p.54.) The district court imposed a sentence of
seven years fixed. (R., pp.72-77.) Ray filed a notice of appeal timely from the judgment of
conviction. (R., pp.81-84.)
Ray asserts his sentence is excessive in light of his difficult childhood, acceptance of
responsibility, substance abuse, mental health issues, and claim that the district court did not
sufficiently consider the factors listed under I.C. § 19-2523(1) when imposing his sentence.
(Appellant’s brief, pp.3-9.) The record supports the sentence imposed.
When evaluating whether a sentence is excessive, the court considers the entire length of
the sentence under an abuse of discretion standard. State v. McIntosh, 160 Idaho 1, 8, 368 P.3d
621, 628 (2016); State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148, 191 P.3d 217, 226 (2008). It is presumed
that the fixed portion of the sentence will be the defendant’s probable term of confinement. State
v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 687, 391 (2007). Where a sentence is within statutory
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PSI page numbers correspond with the page numbers of the electronic file “Supreme Court No.
45604 Michael Lynn Ray Confidential Exhibits.pdf.”
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limits, the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion.
McIntosh, 160 Idaho at 8, 368 P.3d at 628 (citations omitted). To carry this burden the appellant
must show the sentence is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts. Id. A sentence is
reasonable if it appears necessary to accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and
to achieve any or all of the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution. Id. The
district court has the discretion to weigh those objectives and give them differing weights when
deciding upon the sentence. Id. at 9, 368 P.3d at 629; State v. Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 825, 965
P.2d 174, 185 (1998) (court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the objectives of
punishment, deterrence and protection of society outweighed the need for rehabilitation). “In
deference to the trial judge, this Court will not substitute its view of a reasonable sentence where
reasonable minds might differ.” McIntosh, 160 Idaho at 8, 368 P.3d at 628 (quoting Stevens,
146 Idaho at 148-49, 191 P.3d at 226-27). Furthermore, “[a] sentence fixed within the limits
prescribed by the statute will ordinarily not be considered an abuse of discretion by the trial
court.” Id. (quoting State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 90, 645 P.2d 323, 324 (1982)).
The maximum prison sentence for possession of methamphetamine is seven years. I.C. §
37-2732(c)(1). The district court imposed a sentence of seven years fixed, which falls within the
statutory guidelines. (R., pp.72-77.) Furthermore, Ray’s sentence is appropriate in light of his
incessant substance abuse and criminal offending, ongoing absconding behavior and disregard
for the terms of community supervision, failure to rehabilitate or be deterred despite numerous
prior treatment opportunities and legal sanctions, and high risk to reoffend.
Ray’s criminal history dates back more than 30 years and includes juvenile adjudications
for malicious injury to property, petit theft, grand theft, DWP, and two adjudications for habitual
truancy, as well as criminal convictions for failure to purchase/invalid driver’s license, two
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convictions for dog at large, petit theft, disturbing the peace, two convictions for
resisting/obstructing officers, aggravated battery on a law enforcement officer, two convictions
for bail jumping, possession of a forged check, four convictions for forgery, frequenting a place
where controlled substances are used, possession of drug paraphernalia, possession of a
controlled substance with the intent to deliver, and two prior convictions for felony possession of
a controlled substance. (PSI, pp.6-14.) Ray’s record also includes numerous probation and
parole violations, and he has been sanctioned on multiple occasions for contempt of court and
failure to appear. (PSI, pp.9-11, 15-17.) He has been in and out of prison since 1991, and while
incarcerated, he repeatedly incurred DOR’s for disobeying orders, possessing contraband, and
testing positive for methamphetamine. (PSI, pp.15-17.)
Ray was first granted parole in 1993; since that time, he has violated parole at least 10
separate times, frequently by continuing to use illegal drugs, failing to attend treatment, failing to
report for and/or absconding supervision, and committing new crimes, and he also received two
Special Progress Report/Warning Letters for ongoing drug use and avoiding supervision. (PSI,
pp.5, 15-17; 11/6/17 Tr., p.10, Ls.16-18; p.12, Ls.21-22.) In addition, he has topped out his
sentences while in custody in at least five separate cases over the years. (PSI, pp.15-17.) The
presentence evaluator determined that Ray presents a high risk to reoffend and recommended a
prison sentence “[b]ased on [Ray’s] ongoing criminal behavior” and “level of assessed risk.”
(PSI, p.30.) Ray has clearly not been deterred despite repeated legal sanctions and he presents a
risk to the community due to his complete disregard for the law and the terms of community
supervision.
Ray has also continued to abuse substances and engage in criminal behavior despite the
abundance of rehabilitative programming and mental health treatment he has been afforded. He
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has “been involved in counseling or therapy on an off and on basis since he was eight” years old;
he has been treated on an inpatient basis at facilities including Aspen Crest Hospital, State
Hospital North, Canyon View Behavioral Health, and the Alcohol Treatment Unit at Orofino; he
completed a rider at NICI (in 1990), the Lifeline Therapeutic Community program (in 2008), and
the Correctional Alternative Placement Program (in 2011); he participated in community-based
programs including the Community Mental Health Program, Adult Mental Health, St. Luke’s
Behavioral Health, Positive Connections, Wellness Tree, the Intensive Supervision program,
CAPP aftercare, and Intensive Outpatient treatment at the Port of Hope; he completed classes
including Cognitive Self Change, Relapse Prevention, Cognitive Behavioral Therapy, Thinking
for a Change, Anger Management, CAPP Matrix, and Moral Reconation Therapy; and, “[i]n the
year prior to his arrest in this case,” he resided at the Victory Home and the Renaissance House
clean and sober living homes. (PSI, pp.7, 9, 15-19, 23-26, 36, 39, 69, 73, 93.)
The mental health evaluator concluded that Ray “seeks treatment when needed,” “appears
to respond to medications” to manage his symptoms, and “follows treatment recommendations,”
and Ray reported that he is “pretty well managed on his medications” and that, in the months
leading up to the instant offense, he was receiving treatment through St. Luke’s Behavioral
Health and was also seeing a counselor at Positive Connections; he nevertheless continued to
violate the law and use illegal drugs, admitting that he was “regularly using 4 grams of
methamphetamine daily” at the time of the instant offense. (PSI, pp.26, 39, 52, 55, 92.) Ray’s
abysmal failure to rehabilitate is demonstrated by the fact that his substance abuse and illegal
behavior has continued unabated despite the abundance of treatment he has been afforded over
the past 37 years, the reported effectiveness of his mental health treatment and his apparent
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compliance with it, and the fact that he was participating in treatment while on parole at the time
that he chose to abscond and commit the instant offense.
On appeal, Ray contends that the district court did not sufficiently consider the factors
listed under I.C. § 19-2523(1) when imposing his sentence “because the trial court did not even
mention [his mental health].” (Appellant’s brief, p.8.) However, a trial court is not required to
articulate its consideration of the factors listed under I.C. § 19-2523(1). See, e.g., State v.
Furlong, 132 Idaho 526, 529, 975 P.2d 1191, 1194 (Ct. App. 1999) (“The sentencing court is not
required to check off or recite each factor that it considers for the benefit of the defendant.”).
Furthermore, it is hardly surprising that the district court did not specifically address Ray’s
mental health given that Ray’s primary diagnosis is related entirely to his illegal drug abuse, his
issues were determined to be the result of his substance abuse and antisocial behavior rather than
a mental illness, and no mental health treatment was recommended. (PSI, pp.46, 52, 55-56, 76.)
According to the mental health assessment that was completed in October 2017, Ray’s
current diagnosis is “Other Stimulant Abuse with Stimulant-Induced Psychotic Disorder with
Delusions,” and he has “Rule Out” diagnoses of Antisocial Personality Disorder and PostTraumatic Stress Disorder. 2 (PSI, pp.55-56.) The mental health evaluator advised that Ray’s
legal status is “not related to a mental illness but rather appears to be related to his substance use
and antisocial behavior,” which is consistent with an earlier mental health evaluator’s conclusion
that the “majority of [Ray’s] issues” stem from his drug use and “a corroborating personality
disorder” rather than a mental illness. (PSI, pp.52, 76.) Even Ray felt that the “biggest” problem
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Ray’s “Rule-Out” diagnosis of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder is related to a “one-time
incident” of “sexual trauma” that occurred approximately 40 years ago; however, it is
noteworthy that, during a recent period of inpatient mental health treatment, Ray “denie[d] any
past or recent posttraumatic stress disorder symptoms” with respect to his past trauma. (PSI,
pp.55, 90-91.)
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areas or factors in his life that contributed to his legal problems were his “financial issues,” not
his mental health. (PSI, p.27.) The fact that Ray was already being treated for his mental health
issues while he was in the community via counseling and medication management and was
“pretty well managed on his medications” also indicates that his decision to commit the instant
offense was not driven by his mental health issues. (PSI, pp.39, 92.) Furthermore, no mental
health treatment was recommended by either of the mental health evaluators in this case, one of
whom advised that Ray “has a functional need in regards to his substance use however it is not
related to a mental illness.” (PSI, pp.46, 54, 56.)
Even if Ray’s mental health was a significant factor at sentencing, the record shows that
the district court did consider Ray’s mental health and treatment potential. (R., p.55.) First, the
district court ordered a complete I.C. § 19-2524 mental health assessment for its consideration in
sentencing Ray.

(R., p.55; PSI, p.48.) At sentencing, the district court noted that it had

considered the presentence materials, and Ray addressed his “long mental health history” and
current mental health issues. (11/6/17 Tr., p.6, Ls.7-9; p.12, Ls.7-8; p.13, Ls.1-4.) The district
court’s subsequent comments indicate that it had considered Ray’s mental health issues and
history of treatment, but determined that the plethora of treatment programs had been to no avail
since Ray persisted in abusing illegal substances and committing felony crimes. (11/6/17 Tr.,
p.15, Ls.5-21.) The court stated:
… I’m talking about you’ve been given every latitude there is, and I think
you’re getting used to latitude.
This is your ninth, by my count, your ninth felony, and it’s time for it to
stop. There comes a point at which it becomes clear that someone is just a serial
felon and no matter what you do you’re going to go out and commit new felonies.
That’s the –
I’m sorry to be jaded, but that’s kind of the view I see here, and I don’t
know what’s going to stop that. I really don’t.
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(11/6/17 Tr., p.15, Ls.13-25.) The district court concluded, “In your case, the most important
thing is to protect society from this kind of ongoing criminal behavior.” (11/6/17 Tr., p.16, Ls.911.)
The district court considered all of the relevant information and imposed a reasonable
sentence.

Ray’s sentence is appropriate in light of his three-decade history of unremitted

criminal offending and substance abuse, his abject disregard for the terms of community
supervision, his high risk to reoffend, and his failure to rehabilitate or be deterred despite
numerous prior legal sanctions and a 37-year history of participation in treatment. Given any
reasonable view of the facts, Ray has failed to establish an abuse of discretion.

Conclusion
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Ray‘s conviction and sentence.

DATED this 21st day of June, 2018.

__/s/_Lori A. Fleming____________
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General

VICTORIA RUTLEDGE
Paralegal

8

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 21st day of June, 2018, served a true and correct
copy of the attached RESPONDENT’S BRIEF by emailing an electronic copy to:
LARA E. ANDERSON
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
at the following email address: briefs@sapd.state.id.us.

__/s/_Lori A. Fleming____________
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General
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